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How much are people willing to forego to be honest, to follow the rules? When people do break the
rules, what can standard data sources tell us about their behavior? Standard economic models of crime
typically assume that individuals are indifferent to dishonesty, so that they will cheat or lie as long
as the expected pecuniary benefits exceed the expected costs of being caught and punished. We investigate
this presumption by studying the response to a change in tax reporting rules that made it much more
difficult for taxpayers to evade taxes by inappropriately claiming additional dependents. The policy
reform induced a substantial reduction in the number of dependents claimed, which indicates that many
filers had been cheating before the reform. Yet, the number of filers who availed themselves of this
evasion opportunity is dwarfed by the number of filers who passed up substantial tax savings by not
claiming extra dependents. By declining the opportunity to cheat, these taxpayers reveal information
about their willingness to pay to be honest. We present a novel method for inferring the characteristics
of taxpayers in the absence of audit data. Our analysis suggests both that this willingness to pay to
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The rational actor model that forms the basis for microeconomics has been fruitfully extended to
many realms of human behavior, including criminal activity. The benchmark model of crime goes
back to Becker (1968), which posits that an individual will commit a crime when the expected
benets exceed the expected costs. This same framework has been used to study the decision to
evade taxation, beginning with the seminal contribution of Allingham and Sandmo (1972). These
models assume that individuals face no psychological cost of breaking the law { they bear no
intrinsic cost for being dishonest, but instead make a purely pecuniary calculation.
In the area of tax compliance, existing research has demonstrated a strong negative correlation
between evasion and the probability of being caught, which broadly supports a model of rational
calculation without refuting the possibility of a preference for honesty. For example, audit data
show that sources of income that are not subject to third-party reporting are far more likely to
be underreported (Klepper and Nagin 1989), to the extent that less than half of all income from
self employment is claimed (Slemrod 2007). Recent research has pushed this claim further. Based
on a randomized audit experiment, Kleven, Knudsen, Kreiner, Pederson and Saez (2010) conclude
that \overall tax evasion is low, not because taxpayers are unwilling to cheat, but because they are
unable to cheat successfully due to the widespread use of third-party reporting" (p. 3).
Yet, other authors have concluded that the observed levels of tax compliance are too high to
be explained by the standard Allingham and Sandmo (1972) framework, arguing that some desire
to be honest or to comply with social norms must be important (Andreoni, Erard and Feinstein
1998). Directly asking taxpayers does not clarify their motivations for compliance. In 2010, 87%
of taxpayers surveyed stated that it is not acceptable to cheat at all, and 97% agreed with the
statement that \It is every American's civic duty to pay their fair share of taxes." But, 64% said
that fear of audit was important in inducing them to pay their taxes honestly (Internal Revenue
Service Oversight Board 2011). This paper contributes to the literature on tax compliance by using
a novel strategy for detecting tax evasion and quantifying the willingness to pay to be honest, based
on an examination of taxpayer response to a change in enforcement.
In 1987, millions of children suddenly \went missing" from the rolls of federal income tax
returns. The reason was a change in reporting requirements, which eliminated an important avenue
2for evasion. To claim a dependent prior to 1987, a ler needed only to list the dependent's rst
name on his tax return. Since the Internal Revenue Service had no easy way to verify that these
dependents existed or to ensure that they were not listed on multiple returns, the system may
have tempted lers to either invent dependents or to claim ineligible individuals as dependents.
Below, we show that many lers availed themselves of this opportunity and claimed ctitious or
otherwise ineligible dependents. On the other hand, we estimate that a majority of taxpayers in
our sample were unwilling to cheat to gain around $500 in 2010 dollars, equivalent to roughly 1% of
the mean after-tax income and 7% of the mean taxes owed in 1986. We interpret this as evidence
that many taxpayers have a substantial taste for honesty, and that an unwillingness to cheat is thus
an important component of the economics of tax evasion, and perhaps crime more generally. We
also demonstrate how the response to the enforcement change can be used to uncover dierences
in characteristics across cheaters and honest taxpayers without relying on audit data. Our ndings
suggest that cheaters and honest taxpayers are fairly similar in many observable characteristics,
including the tax value of cheating.1
Our analysis is performed on a panel of tax return data that spans the Tax Reform Act of 1986
(TRA86), which included the reporting change. As of 1987, lers were newly required to report
a Social Security Number (SSN) for all dependents over the age of 5. Given this information, it
was relatively easy for the IRS to verify the existence of dependents and to check that they were
not listed on multiple returns, and consequently the probability of cheating without detection fell
precipitously. The response to this change in reporting rules was pronounced. Our data show
that the number of dependents claimed in 1987 fell by 5.5%, which is equivalent to 4.2 \missing
children".
We are not the rst to document this decline in the number of dependents claimed. An IRS
report detailed the motivation for the policy change and provided estimates of the change in the
number of dependents claimed in response to the reform (Szilagyi 1990). Moreover, the episode is
cited in two popular public nance texts (Slemrod and Bakija 2008; Gruber 2009) and a mainstream
book on economics (Levitt and Dubner 2005). But, while the basic facts of this event are known,
1A number of studies using audit data have tested for dierences in evasion across income categories, gender and
tax rates (Clotfelter 1983; Feinstein 1991; Christian 1994). These articles do not, however, indicate whether these
evasion dierences are due to dierent opportunities to evade or dierent propensities conditional on opportunity.
Our case study has the advantage of being an opportunity that is readily available to all taxpayers, which allows us
to isolate evasion predilection.
3no prior work has studied the behavioral responses in detail, nor has any other research used this
incident to quantify evasion, measure the willingness to pay to be honest, or estimate the dierences
in characteristics between honest taxpayers and cheaters, as we do here.
Early waves of empirical research on tax evasion were based on audit data, survey data and
laboratory experiments, each of which has strengths and weaknesses.2 Our work relates more
closely to a newer stream of research that uncovers indirect evidence of evasion, which Slemrod
and Weber (Forthcoming) call \traces of evasion." An early example of this strategy is Pissarides
and Weber (1989), which compares national income product account and reported taxable income
to infer underreporting. Feldman and Slemrod (2007) infer evasion by comparing the marginal
increase in charitable donations with respect to sources of income subject to dierent third-party
reporting requirements. Our analysis diers from these by leveraging a natural experiment from a
change in enforcement policy to uncover facts about evasion without the benet of audit data.3
Researchers within and outside of economics have incorporated a variety of social factors into
models of compliance. Tyler (1990) argues that citizens obey the law out of a sense of allegiance
to a government they view as a legitimate authority. Smith (1992) applies this idea to the case of
tax ling, documenting with survey evidence that self-reported voluntary compliance is positively
correlated with viewing the tax authority as fair and responsive. Cowell (1992) considers a general
model of evasion where the equity of the tax system inuences preferences without specifying a
functional form, and Bordignon (1993) models an environment in which social concerns create a
constraint on the amount of evasion available. Related implications have been tested in laboratory
experiments. There is evidence that evasion responds to cues about fairness (Spicer and Becker
1980) and to the uses of revenue (Becker, B uchner and Sleeking 1987).
The models most closely related to our work incorporate honesty directly. Block and Heineke
(1975) introduce a \preference for honesty" into a labor supply model, allowing the disutility of work
to dier for activities that are legal versus illegal. Erard and Feinstein (1994) introduce compliance
behavior by assuming that some fraction of consumers will never cheat. Gordon (1989), which
2For a thorough discussion and critique of the literature see Andreoni et al. (1998) and Slemrod (2007). Of
particular interest to our work is the nding from laboratory studies that some people comply with the tax authority,
even when the probability of audit is known to be zero, which implies a desire to be honest (Baldry 1987; Alm,
McClelland and Schulze 1992)
3Our approach also has an anity with non-income-tax studies that uncover cheating indirectly, such as Jacob
and Levitt (2003), Fisman and Wei (2004), and Oliva (2010).
4is perhaps most similar to our model, adds a psychic cost to the Allingham and Sandmo (1972)
framework where the consumer faces a continuous evasion choice. Individuals with the highest
psychic costs rarely evade, but, assuming decreasing absolute risk aversion, are predicted to evade
more when the tax rate increases. Our model is distinct from existing work in analyzing a discrete
choice to cheat (by claiming a dependent) and in providing a direct parameterization that we take
to data in order to quantify the willingness to pay to be honest.
Our analysis proceeds as follows. In section 2, we provide additional details about the change
in reporting policy and the other tax law modications in TRA86 relevant to our analysis. In
section 3 we describe our data, which is a panel of tax returns spanning the reform. In section 4 we
document the decline in the number of dependents claimed in 1987. We argue that the substantial
decline cannot be accounted for by other changes in dependent rules that were part of TRA86.
In section 5 we ip to the other side of the coin and document the tax savings foregone by the
majority of lers who did not claim additional dependents and were therefore unaected by the
policy reform. We show that average tax savings given up by honest taxpayers from claiming one
inappropriate dependent would have been roughly $250 in 1986 dollars on average, which equates
to $500 in 2010 dollars, or 1% of after-tax income and 7% of the average total tax paid. We show
that accounting for risk preferences has a limited impact on these magnitudes.
In section 6 we impute the average characteristics of cheaters, as compared to groups of honest
taxpayers, and conclude that they look dierent on several dimensions, including ler status and
claiming of the Child Care Credit. The average cheater does not, however, appear to have a higher
monetary gain from cheating than the average honest taxpayer. This suggests that the variation in
the decision to cheat is not driven primarily by the tax savings at stake, but instead by variation
in the willingness to pay to be honest. We interpret this as a second piece of evidence in support of
the notion that a taste for honesty is quantitatively important for the analysis of evasion. Section
7 concludes.
2 The introduction of Social Security information on tax returns
Prior to 1987, a tax ler needed to include only the rst names of any dependent children he wished
to claim on his return. In contrast, starting in 1987, the 1040 required the full name and SSN of all
5Figure 1: The Change in Reporting Required on the 1040
(a) 1986 Exemption Portion of the 1040
(b) 1987 Exemption Portion of the 1040
Note: The gure shows portions from the 1040 form in 1986 and 1987. The 1986 1040 required only
the rst names of dependents, whereas the 1987 required the full name, birth date and Social Security
Number for all children over age 5.
children over age 5. The relevant portions of the 1040 from 1986 and 1987 are shown in gure 1.
The SSN requirement was extended to all dependents age 2 and older beginning in tax year 1989,
to all dependents at least one year old in 1991, and nally to all dependents in 1995.4 The IRS
took this step out of concerns that there was signicant misreporting. Regular audits had revealed
that a signicant fraction of audited tax returns involved adjustments for personal exemptions that
were disallowed (Szilagyi 1990). The gradual reduction in ages aected by the SSN requirement
was designed to give families time to obtain Social Security Numbers for children.5
While the reporting requirement for claiming a dependent exemption changed in 1986, the
4In the early years of the dependent SSN requirement, the IRS did little verication of this new information. Only
3 percent of dependent SSNs were computer matched to uncover dual claiming of dependents or violations of the age
and income tests (General Accounting Oce 1993).
5Today more than 90% of SSNs issued to children are issued at the time of birth (GAO 2005). This is made
possible through the Enumeration at Birth program, launched in 1989. This partnership between the Social Security
Administration and state vital statistics agencies allows parents to request an SSN for their child as part of the birth
certicate registration process.
6underlying denition of a dependent did not change. Five tests must be met in order for a taxpayer
to claim another individual as a dependent. The dependent must be a U.S. citizen or a resident of
the U.S., Canada, or Mexico. The dependent cannot le a joint return. The dependent's income
cannot exceed the personal exemption amount, with exceptions made for a taxpayer's own child
under the age of 19 or under the age of 24 if a full-time student. The dependent must either live
with or be related to the taxpayer claiming her. Finally, more than half of the dependent's support
must be provided by the taxpayer claiming her. None of these tests changed between 1986 and
1987. Analysis by the General Accounting Oce (1993) shows that, with the SSN requirement in
place, violations of the support test are the most common reason for a dependent exemption to be
disallowed.6
The Tax Reform Act of 1986 did make changes that may have inuenced the dependent status
of some individuals. Prior to the reform, a child who was claimed as a dependent by his parents but
who also led his own return could claim a personal exemption for himself. This \double-dipping"
was eliminated by TRA86. Beginning in 1987, dependents were not permitted to claim a personal
exemption and in most cases could claim only a limited standard deduction. This may have created
some negotiation between parents and children about how long to remain a dependent.7 The value
to parents of claiming an additional exemption also changed in 1986. The nominal value of a
personal exemption rose from $1080 to $1900 while marginal tax rates fell for most taxpayers. We
return to these changes below when interpreting our data.
3 Tax return panel data
We use data from the University of Michigan tax panel, compiled by the Oce of Tax Policy
Research (OTPR). The starting point for this dataset is the annual cross-sections of tax return
data released by the Statistics of Income (SOI) division of the IRS. These cross-sections report
6Recent research on dependent overclaiming focuses on the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC). McCubbin (2000)
describes data from a 1994 audit of randomly selected EITC claimants. Approximately 26% of EITC dollars claimed
were overturned upon audit, and about 70% of these overclaims involved an error in claiming an EITC-qualifying
child. McCubbin further nds that misclaiming a child is sensitive to the size of the associated benet. She estimates
that a $100 increase in the tax savings from claiming a child increases the probability of erroneously claiming an
EITC-qualifying child from a mean of 8% to 8.4%. Liebman (2000) estimates the extent of EITC misclaiming by
matching March 1991 CPS respondents to 1990 tax return data. At the time, the EITC was exclusively available to
lers with children. Liebman estimates that 11 to 13% of 1990 EITC recipients did not have a child in their CPS
household as of March 1991, and 10% did not have a child in the household one year earlier.
7See Whittington and Peters (1996) for evidence that the tax eect on this decision is small.
7information from most lines of the tax return and from many supporting schedules. There is
information on the total number of exemptions (including extra exemptions for lers who are blind
or over age 65), the number of exemptions for dependent children (reported separately for children
living at home and children living away from home), and the number of exemptions for dependents
other than children. To protect taxpayer condentiality, income amounts are blurred and the
number of exemptions is topcoded in some cases.8 The panel links the tax returns of individuals
who appear in multiple SOI cross-sections from 1979 to 1990.
Selection into the panel is based on the last four digits of the primary ler's SSN. The number
of four-digit combinations included in the panel changed over time, leading to wide variation in
the number of tax returns included in dierent years. Approximately 45,000 returns are included
in the years with the most widespread coverage, while slightly over 9,000 returns are included in
tax years 1982, 1984, and 1986. The number of tax ling units present in all 12 years of the panel
is 4,982, and the number present in both 1986 and 1987 is 9,099. A change in marital status may
cause an individual to be dropped from the panel, as only the SSN of the primary ler is used
in linking returns across years. If an individual has been ling as a single person, marries, and
is subsequently listed as the secondary ler, returns from before and after her marriage will not
be linked. On the other hand, if she is listed as the primary ler after marriage her returns will
be linked. Similarly, if a married couple divorces only the primary ler will be tracked over the
remainder of the panel. Because men are more likely to be listed as primary lers, men have lower
rates of attrition from the tax panel. In contrast to other longitudinal datasets, there is no reason
to expect movers to exit from the panel, unless they stop ling tax returns. The taxpayer's address
is not used in linking cross-sectional les.
4 Many people cheated on their tax returns
Our tax panel data allow us to look at the number of lers who lose net dependents each year by
comparing the number of dependents in one year against the number claimed the following year.
If many lers were cheating up until 1986, then we would expect to see a large number of lers
8For returns with adjusted gross income (AGI) greater than $200,000, the number of exemptions for children living
at home is topcoded at 3. This topcoding is unlikely to aect our results, as only 7 ling units observed in both 1986
and 1987 are aected. The number of ling units aected in any other pair of years over which dependent loss is
calculated is never greater than 22.























Note: Estimates are the authors' calculations from the OTPR tax panel. The number of
dependent exemptions claimed is the sum of exemptions for children living at home, children
living away from home, parents, and other dependents. In computing the share of returns
losing dependents in year t, the denominator is the set of ling units observed in both t and
t   1 and claiming a positive number of dependent exemptions in t   1. In computing the
share of returns gaining dependents in year t, the denominator is all ling units observed in
both t and t   1.
losing dependents in 1987. Figure 2 plots the percentage of lers who lost at least one dependent
in each year of our panel, conditional on claiming a dependent in the previous year. There is a
dramatic spike in 1987, when 20.3% of lers lose a dependent, compared to an average of 14.0% in
all other years.9 The number of \excess" dependent-losing lers in 1987 is equal to 2.5% of the ling
population. Figure 2 also plots the fraction of lers who gain at least one dependent in each year,
which shows no commensurate change between 1986 and 1987. Some cheaters may have chosen to
claim more than one ctitious dependent. The percentage of lers losing multiple dependents is
9There are other cases in which requiring a taxpayer to provide a straightforward piece of supporting evidence has
generated a large change in reporting. Fack and Landais (2011) show that when France rst required that receipts
be submitted with the tax return for any charitable contributions claimed, reported charitable contributions fell by
75%.













1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990
Year
Relative to Pop under 24, OTPR Panel
Relative to Pop under 24, Agg Data
Relative to Pop under 19, OTPR Panel
Relative to Pop under 19, Agg Data
Note: Estimates of the population under 19 and under 24 come from the United States Census
Bureau. Estimates of the number of child dependents claimed on tax returns (including
children living at home and children living away from home) are the authors' calculations
from the OTPR tax panel.
4.4% in 1987, substantially greater than the 2.2% to 2.9% losing multiple dependents in any other
year of the panel. We view this as further evidence of cheating, but throughout the paper we focus
on the decision to claim a marginal extra dependent.
We can also compare the number of child dependents claimed on tax returns to the number
of children in the population from Census estimates. Figure 3 shows the ratio of the number of
child dependent exemptions claimed (for children living at home and children living away from
home) to the number of children under age 19 and to the number of children under age 24. Most
people under age 19 are eligible to be claimed as dependents, but we expect this ratio to be less
than one due to non-ling. Many people between ages 19 and 23 who are full-time students will
also be eligible to be claimed as a dependent. As is evident in the gure, the relationship between
the number of child dependents and the number of children in the population was quite steady
10until 1987, at which time there was a signicant fall in the number of dependents that does not
correspond to any change in the underlying population. This pattern is evident both in the OTPR
panel data (solid lines) and in aggregate child dependent counts (dashed lines).10 Despite the small
size of the OTPR panel, the values we impute from it are a close match to values computed from
aggregate data.
A simple estimate of the number of inappropriate dependent claims can be derived under the
assumption that lers lost more dependents in 1987 than in other years solely because many people
were cheating prior to the reform, but stopped cheating in 1987. Under that assumption, the
\extra" dependent losses observed in the panel between 1986 and 1987 correspond to 4.2 million
improperly claimed dependents, or 5.5% of all dependents claimed in 1986.11 These estimates are
broadly similar to the conclusion reached by an IRS research report, which concluded that the
reform lowered the number of dependents claimed by around 7 million, or 9% (Szilagyi 1990).
Szilagyi (1990) also reports that the 1987 policy change reversed a long-run trend in the number of
dependent exemptions that were determined to be erroneous in the Tax Compliance Management
Program data, which shows a rise from 4.3% of dependent exemptions being erroneous in 1965 to
11.2% in 1979.
4.1 Could the change in dependents be due to those lacking SSNs?
The policy reform in 1987 required that lers record the Social Security Number of dependents
to be claimed, but not all people have a Social Security Number. Could the spike in dependent
reductions be due to many dependents not having an SSN, and thus being left o of the return?
Several factors weigh against this explanation. First, in 1987, children under the age of 5,
who were the most likely not to have an SSN, were exempted from the requirement. Second, we
suspect that anyone who stood to gain from having a dependent exemption would have acquired
an SSN for the relevant dependent upon learning of the requirement. Data from the Social Security
Administration support this view, showing a surge in SSN applications shortly after the policy
10Aggregate data on the number of child dependent exemptions claimed come from the annual IRS publication
1304, and were generously provided to us by Brian Erard.
11TRA86 increased the value of the standard deduction and the personal exemption, which increased the income at
which a person is required to le a tax return. This change in the ling threshold could cause children of low-income
parents to disappear from tax data if their parents are no longer required to le. If we restrict our sample to ling
units with real income above the 1987 ling threshold, we estimate a loss of 3.8 million dependents between 1986 and
1987.
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Note: Each line in the gure corresponds to a dierent subsample from the OTPR panel, the
set of ling units losing at least one dependent in a particular year. The bold line corresponds
to the 721 ling units observed losing at least one dependent in 1987. We follow each sample
over time, computing the share of these ling units gaining a dependent in each earlier and
later year.
change. The number of new SSNs issued had been between 5.4 and 6.7 million in each year from
1980 to 1986. This number increased to 11.6 million in 1987, 11.4 million in 1988, and then
gradually fell back to pre-87 levels by 1993.
Finally, if many lers failed to claim true dependents in 1987 because of the SSN requirement,
we expect that they would have acquired an SSN for these dependents in subsequent years. This
would imply that people who lost a dependent in 1987 should have been especially likely to gain a
dependent in the subsequent several years, once they had acquired the SSN.
To look for this pattern, gure 4 plots the fraction of lers gaining a dependent, conditional
on having lost a dependent in a particular year. The horizontal axis measures time relative to the
year in which a dependent was lost. Each line represents a dierent set of lers, those losing a
dependent in a given year of the sample. The bold line shows lers who lost dependents in 1987.
12Overall, the data show considerable churning. Relative to year zero (when a ler lost a dependent),
lers are relatively likely to have gained a dependent immediately before or after that loss. This
results in part from short-lived marriages in which one member of the couple has children and from
confusion about who can claim a dependent following a divorce. If many lers lost a dependent in
1987 because of missing SSNs, we would have expected a large increase in dependent gains for those
lers in subsequent years, relative to the gain experienced by lers who lost dependents in non-
reform years. This is not the case; 1987 appears typical. If anything, gains are low immediately after
1987 losses, which is consistent with cheaters being less likely than legitimate losers of dependents
to regain the dependent in the subsequent year.12
4.2 Could the change in dependents be due to other changes in TRA86?
The Tax Reform Act of 1986 involved many other tax changes. Could any of these be the source of
a large reduction in dependents? The most obvious feature of TRA86 relevant here is a change in
the tax treatment of dependent lers. Prior to 1986, a child who led his own return could claim a
personal exemption on his return and still be claimed as a dependent by his parents. After 1987,
this was not allowed, so children and parents had to choose whether the child would le with zero
exemptions, and allow the parents to claim the exemption, or vice versa. If many families chose to
allow income-earning children, who qualied as dependents, to claim themselves instead of claiming
them as dependents on the parents' return, then this could generate a one-time drop in dependents
claimed in 1987.
The number of such cases is likely to be small, however, because the exemption would have
rarely been worth more in tax savings to children than to parents. The value of the exemption
depends entirely on the marginal tax rate. Thus, in short, for it to be tax-minimizing for a child
to claim herself, that child would need to earn suciently more money than her parents so as to
be in a higher tax bracket, and yet still live in her parents' home and obtain more than 50% of her
nancial support from her parents, so as to qualify as a dependent.
Such arrangements are rare, as is shown in table 1, which uses March Current Population Survey
12Aggregate data on total annual dependent counts are consistent with the view that most of the dependents lost
in 1987 did not reappear in later years. The total number of dependents claimed divided by the total number of
returns led had been above 0.75 in years 1980-1985, fell from 0.75 in 1986 to 0.67 in 1987, and hovered between 0.66
and 0.69 over the next ten years. We thank Brian Erard for pointing us toward this evidence.
13Table 1: Children's Income Relative to Parents' Income
Full Sample Ages 15-18 Ages 19-23
A. Wage Income
% with Any 54.7 47.6 77.8
Mean Amount 1,317 836 2,883
% with Wages > 0:75 Parents' Wages 6.2 5.5 8.5
% with Wages > Parents' Wages 5.7 5.1 7.3
Median of (Own Wages/Parents' Wages) 0.007 0 0.049
B. Total Income
% with Any 66.2 59.8 86.9
Mean Amount 1,874 1,229 3,977
% with Inc > 0:75 Parents' Inc 2.8 2.5 3.6
% with Inc > Parents' Inc 2.0 1.8 2.6
Median of (Own Inc/Parents' Inc) 0.015 0.005 0.068
N 11,369 8,853 2,516
Data are from the March 1987 CPS, available via IPUMS. The sample is restricted to children of household
heads, and to those either between the ages of 15 and 18 or between the ages of 19 and 23 and enrolled
in school full-time.
(CPS) data from 1987. We constructed a sample of children, between the ages of 15 and 23, living
with one or both parents. The lower age cuto reects the fact that only individuals aged 15 or
older report income information in the CPS. All children between ages 15 and 18 are included,
while children between ages 19 and 23 are included only if they are full-time students. Table 1
shows that 66.2% of these potential dependents had some form of income, and 54.7% had wage
income. Not surprisingly, the median ratio of a child's income to his parents' income is 0.015. Only
2.8% of children had income equal to 75% of their parents' income, and just 2% had income equal
to or greater than their parents'.
In sum, given the low probability that it would have been tax-minimizing for children to claim
themselves, we expect that this aspect of the TRA86 reform is unlikely to explain an important
fraction of the drop in dependents. The vast majority of the missing dependents were likely from
lers who had been cheating prior to the enforcement reform.
145 Many other people paid to be honest
Our data suggest that around 2.5% of taxpayers were cheating by improperly claiming dependents
in 1986. Conversely, this means that 97.5% were not cheating in this way. This is perhaps the more
surprising statistic, given the substantial amount of income that could have been taken at relatively
low risk by claiming fraudulent dependents. Importantly, the 97.5% of tax payers who did not avail
themselves of this opportunity to cheat implicitly demonstrated that they would rather give up
several hundred dollars in income than cheat the government. Overall, we think this is striking
evidence of a broad willingness to pay to be honest across the taxpayer base.
How much did honest taxpayers forgo? Ideally, to answer this question we would like to eliminate
the tax cheaters from the sample and tabulate the distribution of tax savings from claiming an extra
dependent that would have been enjoyed by the honest taxpayers had they cheated. Unfortunately,
there is no way to directly identify the cheaters in the data. We can, however, identify groups
of lers who were almost certainly honest. One such group is the set of lers who did not lose a
dependent between 1986 and 1987, who make up 92% of lers. Below, in section 6, we show how
similar assumptions can be combined with estimates of the number of cheaters to infer dierences
in average characteristics between cheaters and honest payers. Here, we focus just on the tax values
of honest payers.
Table 2 shows the average 1986 tax savings associated with the marginal dependent for lers
who appear in the panel in both 1986 and 1987. These statistics are obtained by comparing
the after-tax income of lers given the actual number of dependents reported in the data against
their hypothetical after-tax income when they have one additional (or one fewer) dependent, as
calculated by TAXSIM.13 The after-tax income gain that would have accrued to families from
claiming one additional child represents the gain to be had from cheating. On average, those who
did not lose a dependent between 1986 and 1987 would have saved $275 on their 1986 taxes by
claiming an additional dependent. The mean savings is even higher, $291, for those who claimed
zero dependents. We view both of these groups as consisting of honest taxpayers. These savings
are in 1986 dollars; inating by the CPI to 2010 dollars doubles the estimates to $547 and $579.14
Are these tax savings, foregone in the interest of civic piety, large? To put the magnitudes in
13The TAXSIM program is described by Feenberg and Coutts (1993).
14We use the CPI-U all items, which was 109.6 in 1986 and almost exactly double, 218.1, in 2010.
15Table 2: The Value of Claiming a Dependent
Gain from Loss from
N Additional One Fewer After-Tax Tax Liability
Dep, 1986 Dep, 1986 Income
Observed in 86 and 87 9,099 271 22,006 3,898
(160) (28,108) (16,573)
No deps in 1986 5,548 291 17,878 3,509
(176) (27,030) (18,081)
Deps in 1986 3,551 239 -271 28,457 4,505
(123) (126) (28,546) (13,875)
Lost dep in 1987 721 224 -254 25,868 3,943
(121) (127) (25,888) (11,082)
Didn't lose in 1987 2,830 243 -276 29,117 4,648
(123) (126) (29,152) (14,499)
Didn't lose dep in 1987 8,378 275 21,674 3,894
(162) (28,268) (16,964)
Calculations of the gain (loss) associated with claiming one additional (fewer) dependent rely on TAXSIM
estimates of tax liability, using income elements and household composition reported on 1986 tax returns.
Standard deviations are in parentheses. After-tax income is dened as AGI minus total income tax
liability, as reported on 1986 tax returns.
context, table 2 also shows the average after-tax income and average income tax paid for lers across
these categories. The foregone gains from cheating, among those who did not lose a dependent in
response to the reform, amount to 1.3% of after-tax income, and 7.1% of taxes paid. These are
substantial amounts.
Figure 5 shows the distribution of tax savings that would have accrued to lers if they had
claimed an additional dependent in 1986, for the sample of returns that did not lose dependents
between 1986 and 1987 (and are therefore assumed to be honest payers). Dependent exemptions
are non-refundable, so claiming an additional dependent has zero impact for low-liability lers.
Among those not losing a dependent between 1986 and 1987, 7.3% would have gained nothing.
The average tax savings from an additional dependent among the remaining lers was larger. In
this sample of presumably honest taxpayers, 69.4% stood to gain at least $200, and 18.0% stood
to gain at least $400 by claiming an extra dependent.
In real dollars, the average foregone tax savings presented in table 2 are as large as the Child
Tax Credit when it was introduced in 1998, and they are 80% of the size of the maximum tax rebate
for single lers in the 2008 stimulus plan. Moreover, past research has found evidence of fertility
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Note: Filing units that appear in both 1986 and 1987, and that do not lose a dependent
between these years, are included in this gure. The gure graphs the dierence between two
tax liabilities for each ling unit, both computed from TAXSIM. The rst value is the tax
liability that results from applying 1986 tax law to actual reported 1986 income and dependent
exemptions. The second value adds one to the number of dependents claimed.
responses to benets of this size. Whittington, Alm and Peters (1990) estimate that TRA86's
increase in the personal exemption, from $1080 to $2000, raised the number of births by 7.53 per
thousand women at risk, though these estimates have been called into question (Crump, Goda and
Mumford 2011). Dickert-Conlin and Chandra (1999) estimate that a $500 benet would increase
the fraction of mothers who give birth in the last week of December rather than the rst week of
January, so as to accelerate tax savings, by 26.9%. The fact that existing research estimates that
real behavioral responses are induced by tax savings of this magnitude suggests that these savings
are \large" in some behavioral sense. This arms our claim that foregoing these benets due to a
taste for honesty is a phenomenon of important magnitude.
175.1 Might audit risk explain a low prevalence of cheating?
Evading taxes is risky. The average tax benets from claiming an extra dependent are, ex ante,
eroded by the possibility of detection and subsequent nes. To determine how much this audit
risk lowers the benets of cheating, we adapt the tax evasion model of Allingham and Sandmo
(1972). Allingham and Sandmo (1972) model a risk averse taxpayer making a decision about what
fraction of his tax bill to evade in order to maximize expected utility in a static setting. We modify
this structure in two ways. First, we add a non-pecuniary cost of cheating, which allows for the
possibility that taxpayers have a distaste for lying to the government (equivalently, a willingness to
pay to be honest). Second, rather than model a continuous choice about how much to evade as in
Gordon (1989), we model a discrete evasion decision, meant to mimic the decision about claiming
an incremental ctitious dependent. This setup is useful in that it formalizes our parameter of
interest, the willingness to pay to be honest, in an optimizing framework.






where z is net income (assumed to be equivalent to consumption) and  is the coecient of relative
risk aversion. Filers choose whether to claim the appropriate number of dependents, in which
case they receive their true after-tax income Y with certainty. Alternatively, lers may choose to
claim an additional, inappropriate dependent, which may reduce their taxes paid but also triggers
a psychological cost of cheating, measured in dollars. If a cheating ler is caught he incurs an







Ui(Cheating) = (1   p)
(Yi + Ti   i)1 
1   
+ p
(Yi   Ti   i)1 
1   
; (3)
where p is the probability of audit, Ti is the tax savings from cheating,  is the penalty for
cheating (expressed as a fraction of the amount evaded), and  is the monetized psychological cost
18of cheating.15 We assume that all audits are successful in detecting any improper dependent claims.
A ler will choose to cheat if the expected payo to cheating exceeds the expected payo to
honesty, accounting for risk aversion and the distaste for deceit. Thus, lers cheat if and only if
(1   p)
(Yi + Ti   i)1 
1   
+ p








This formula does not yield a closed form solution for , but the left-hand side is monotonically
decreasing in  so that, all else equal, a ler will cheat so long as  is below some critical threshold,
which we will label G. Gi is the psychological cost that would make ler i indierent between
cheating and not cheating, dened implicitly as:
(1   p)
(Yi + Ti   Gi)1 
1   
+ p








A tax ler will cheat by claiming an extra dependent if and only if i  Gi. This critical value
Gi is an implicit function of the other parameters, including income, taxes saved by cheating, the
penalty, risk aversion and the probability of audit. To determine how much risk assessment erodes
the nominal value of cheating, we can calculate G, given parameter values for the other variables,
and compare G to T. If the two are similar, it means that risk has little impact on the nominal
value of cheating { you would have to take away a large amount of money for sure in order to make
the decision-maker indierent between cheating and not.
Table 3 presents results from this exercise. We start by calculating the value for someone with
the mean after-tax income in our 1986 sample of lers who did not lose a dependent in 1987, which is
$21,670. We model a tax savings equal to the mean in our sample for these lers, $275. The fraction
of tax returns audited in 1986 was around 2%, so we begin with p = :02 as our baseline probability
of detection.16 For risk aversion, we begin with  = 2, which is close to estimates in Chetty (2006)
and Attanasio and Paiella (2011). There are two classes of penalties for underpayment of taxes,
described in sections 6662 and 6663 of the Internal Revenue Code. Any part of underpayment due
to \negligence or disregard of rules or regulations" is subject to a 20% penalty, while any part of
15We have in mind an internal cost that is independent of whether cheating is discovered and publicized, in contrast
to a notion of shame felt only when any wrong-doing is made known to others.
16Between 1977 and 1986, the audit rate gradually fell from 1.88% to 1% (Dubin, Graetz and Wilde 1990). Between
1988 and 1995, the audit rate ranged between values of 0.92% and 1.67% (General Accounting Oce 1996).
19Table 3: Sample Values of the Role of Risk
Y T  p  G p
21,670 275 2 .02 .2 268 .83
21,670 275 2 .02 .75 265 .57
21,670 275 10 .02 .75 264 .54
21,670 275 100 .02 .75 242 .31
10,835 275 2 .02 .2 268 .83
2,167 275 2 .02 .2 267 .81
10,835 275 10 .02 .2 267 .81
2,167 275 10 .02 .2 259 .72
10,835 275 10 .02 .75 263 .52
2,167 275 10 .02 .75 238 .31
21,670 275 2 .2 .2 208 
10,835 275 10 .2 .75 160 
21,670 275 2 .4 .2 142 
10,835 275 10 .4 .75 56 
21,670 275 2 .6 .2 76 
10,835 275 10 .6 .75 -38 
Table shows pretax income Y , the change in taxes paid from evasion
T, the coecient of absolute risk aversion , the probability of audit
p, the IRS penalty as a fraction of taxes evaded , the break-even
willingness to pay to be honest, which makes a taxpayer indierent
between cheating and not G, and the probability of audit that would
make the taxpayer indierent between cheating and not if G = 0, p
.
underpayment attributable to fraud is subject to a 75% penalty. If taxpayers can claim plausible
confusion about their mispayment, they will pay the 20% rate, which applies to the vast majority
of cases. We use this as our baseline, so  = :2. Throughout this exercise, we assume lers are not
cheating in any way other than misclaiming a dependent.
The rst row of table 3 shows our baseline estimates. An individual who could save $275 in
taxes by improperly claiming a dependent would be willing to do so as long as his psychological cost
of cheating is below $268. This suggests that, for our baseline parameters, risk is not an important
explanation for why so many taxpayers failed to cheat. Another way to see this is to calculate the
probability of audit that would make a ler indierent between cheating and not cheating, which we
label as p, given the other parameters and assuming G = 0. For our baseline case, that break-even
probability is an extremely high 83%.
For robustness, we vary these parameters, starting with the risk coecient . The top panel
20shows that, even at the higher IRS penalty rate, raising the risk coecient 50-fold has a negligible
impact on the value of cheating.17 The middle panel of table 3 shows what happens when we lower
the starting income value to one-half of the mean, which is the 34th percentile of our non-cheating
1986 sample, or one-tenth of the mean, which is the 6th percentile. Even at higher values of risk
aversion and with the higher IRS penalty and very low starting income, risk assessment only lowers
the value of cheating by about 13%.
The only parameter that substantially changes the value of cheating is the probability of audit,
which is shown in the third panel. Obviously, if lers believe that the probability of audit is 100%,
then cheating would never be worth doing under any circumstances. If lers believe the probability
of being caught is 20%, instead of the generic 2%, then the payo falls by around one-quarter, to
$208. If we assume the higher risk aversion, halve income, and raise the penalty rate, then this
estimate falls further to $160. Table 3 also shows what happens if the chance of getting caught is
40% or 60%. This further erodes the value, but note that cheating is still a net positive, except in
the very last scenario, which combines all of the most extreme assumptions.
Might taxpayers believe the probability of audit is extremely high? Precise survey data are
not available, but some information about perceived audit probabilities is available from the 1987
Taxpayer Opinion Survey. When asked about the likelihood of their 1986 returns being audited,
35% of respondents said it was not very likely, 42% said it was highly unlikely, and another 15%
were not sure. Might taxpayers believe that conditional on claiming an additional dependent the
probability of audit is extremely high? The IRS does use a formula to determine audits (the
Discriminant Index Function), but it is highly unlikely that claiming a dependent can change the
formula by much. Even if all audits were conned to returns with dependents, this would have a
modest impact on audit probabilities, relative to the dierences needed to alter values qualitatively
in table 3. This is another advantage of our study { we analyze an evasion opportunity that is
especially unlikely to trigger audit.18
17Estimates of the coecient of relative risk aversion based on observed equity return premiums are in the neigh-
borhood of 50 (DeLong and Magin 2009).
18It is plausible that frequent changes in the number of dependents claimed might trigger audit. If so, the decision
to falsely claim a dependent in one year might lock a taxpayer into making the same false claim for several years.
We have investigated whether the 1987 dependent losers have unusually high variance in the number of dependents
claimed across earlier years, as would be the case if cheaters fabricate dependents for just one or a few years at a
time. There is no evidence of dierences in the variance of children claimed for likely cheaters and for likely honest
taxpayers.
21This framework formalizes the economic interpretation of our data from the 1986 reform. Those
people who did not cheat must have a i  Gi, where Gi will be roughly 97.5% of the estimated
tax savings in table 2 for our base case, and well over 90% for even the most extreme scenarios,
unless taxlers believe their probability of being caught is much higher than the actual audit rates.
Based on this, we conclude that the taste for honesty is substantial, even accounting for risk.19
5.2 Might ignorance explain a low prevalence of cheating?
An alternative interpretation is that lers who did not claim ctitious dependents prior to the
reform were not doing so out of love of country, but instead because the opportunity to cheat had
simply never occurred to them. Unfortunately, there is no way to directly measure the number
of people who lacked the insight to cheat in this way. That said, this evasion opportunity is very
simple and easy to achieve. It is also especially transparent, as the box for dependents claimed is
right at the top of the 1040, as shown in gure 1. Moreover, if lers do not have a distaste for
cheating, then we would expect them to invest some time in searching for low-hanging evasion fruit,
like the dependent exemption. If lers were ignorant because they had no intention of cheating
and therefore did not look for easy ways to cheat, then this is a round about way of arming our
hypothesis that they are willing to pay to be honest.
We suspect that people who claimed dependents at some point in time, and particularly those
who had a change in the number of dependents, are aware of the tax value of dependents and
the limited information required to claim those dependents prior to the reform. For lers who
appear in all years of the tax panel, 66% had a dependent at some point in time, and 59% have a
change in the number of dependents claimed during the sample period.20 Narrowing in on a group
likely to be honest, lers who do not lose a dependent between 1986 and 1987, 34% are claiming a
dependent, and 32% had changed the number of dependents before 1986. This suggests that there
is a substantial opportunity to learn about the potential gains from claiming dependents and the
relative ease of doing so.
19In principle, estimates of the distribution of the willingness to pay to be honest could be estimated by comparing
the amount of cheating at dierent tax values, given an additional assumption about the joint distribution of T and
G. We pursued this empirical strategy but determined that the available tax panel data are of insucient sample
size given the observed variation in tax values to produce meaningful estimates.
20For lers who appear at least once in the panel, 44% had a dependent at some point and 27% have an observed
change in number of dependents claimed.
22In sum, there is no way to know whether any particular individual who failed to use the child
loophole to lower his tax bill did so out of ignorance. Moreover, it is impossible to know what
fraction of the honest taxpayers fall into that category. It seems likely, however, that lers with a
thirst for cheating would have come across this possibility, particularly if they had experience with
dependent exemptions, as most taxpayers do.
6 Who cheated and why?
6.1 Cheaters have dierences in tax return characteristics
Who cheated? Are they dierent from honest payers on observable characteristics? To answer
such questions, we would ideally like to know who cheated in pre-reform years, and compare their
characteristics to honest taxpayers. Our panel data allow us to identify those who lost a dependent
in 1987, but there is no immediate way to distinguish those who lost a dependent for legitimate
reasons from cheaters who reacted to the reform.
Fortunately, we can detect large dierences in observable characteristics between cheaters and
non-cheaters by looking at changes in summary statistics across treatment years, where the number
of cheaters present in particular subsamples varies widely and measurably. We pursue three dierent
comparisons that use this basic approach. All three combine mild distributional assumptions with
estimates of the number of cheaters in particular subsamples (taken from changes in observable
statistics in response to the policy reform) to uncover facts about the characteristics of cheaters.
These approaches may prove useful in other contexts. Here, they are especially compelling because
all three approaches yield similar estimates, indicating that cheaters were more likely to be heads
of household, less likely to be married ling jointly, and more likely to claim the Child Care Credit.
First, suppose that cheaters and non-cheaters have dierent distributions for some characteristic
X. If the set of 1987 dependent losers includes a substantial number of cheaters, then the value
of taxpayer characteristics among those who lost a dependent will be dierent in 1987 than in
earlier years. This assumes that anyone losing a dependent in an earlier year, when misclaiming a
dependent was quite simple and involved little risk of detection, must be honest. Specically, the
mean value of characteristic X among all those who lost a dependent in 1987, denoted x, can be
written as a weighted sum of the mean of X for cheaters c
x and non-cheaters h
x, where the weights
23are equal to the probability that someone in the sample is a cheater :
x = c
x + (1   )h
x: (6)




x = (x   h
x)=: (7)
Thus, given an estimate of the pooled mean x, the mean of honest taxpayers h
x, and the proportion
of the 1987 sample that were cheaters , we can calculate an estimate of the dierence in mean
characteristics between cheaters and non-cheaters. We have a ready estimate of x from our sample
of returns, since it is simply the mean of all 1987 dependent losers. In section 4 we estimated that
31% of those losing a dependent in 1987 were cheaters, which provides an estimate of .
To obtain an estimate of h
x we use the mean of characteristic X for lers reporting a dependent
loss in an earlier year. TRA86 created many changes in the tax code that might cause dierences in
observable characteristics. To avoid conating these changes with the dierences between cheaters
and non-cheaters, we measure the characteristics of the 1987 dependent losers in 1986, the year
prior. For consistency, we compute means in the year before dependent loss for the comparison
group of honest taxpayers.
Table 4 shows the results of this exercise. Column 1 shows the sample mean of characteristics
listed measured in 1985 for taxpayers who lost a dependent in 1986. This is our estimate of the mean
characteristic for honest taxpayers who lose a dependent. Column 2 shows the mean characteristic
on 1986 tax returns (before the reform), for those taxpayers who lost a dependent in 1987 (when the
reform took eect). Asterisks indicate that this value is statistically dierent from column 1 at the
10% level based on a simple comparison of means. Column 3 shows our estimate of the dierence
in each characteristic between cheaters and honest losers of dependents, based on equation 7 and
assuming  = 0:31.
Column 3 of table 4 shows that there are signicant dierences between cheaters and those
who lost a dependent for legitimate reasons. In particular, cheaters were much less likely to be
24Table 4: Summary Statistics for Filers Losing a Dependent
Lost Dep Lost Dep Mean Di: Among 1987 Losers:
in 1986 in 1987 Cheaters - Lost Previously?
Honest Yes No
(c h
x) (c x) ( d c
x   h
x) (Honest) (Cheaters)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
% Married, year t   1 69.9 62.3* -24.5 71.1 54.5*
% Head of Household, year t   1 23.3 31.1* 25.2 23.5 37.7*
% with Change in Filing Status 21.1 24.7 11.6 19.0 29.6*
% with Change in State 3.6 4.2 1.9 3.3 4.9
Mean dependents, year t   1 2.1 2.3 0.6 2.1 2.4*
Mean  in number of Deps -1.2 -1.3* -0.3 -1.2 -1.4*
Zero Dependents after Loss 47.9 44.1 -12.3 47.3 41.3
Head of HH to Single after Loss 10.4 13.2 9.0 10.4 15.6*
Last Dependent Had no Tax Value 7.3 5.4 -6.1 3.6 7.0*
% with Child Care Credit, year t   1 7.8 12.8* 16.1 10.1 15.1*
% with EITC, year t   1 13.1 14.8 5.5 13.4 16.1
% age 65 or older as of 1987 6.0 4.4 -5.2 4.2 4.7
% age 65 or older as of 1990 9.5 7.5 -6.5 8.0 7.0
Mean AGI ($), year t   1 35,695 35,550 -468 40,250 31,448*
% itemizing, year t   1 53.6 49.0 -14.8 56.5 42.3*
% contrib. IRA, year t   1 21.7 16.5* -16.8 20.2 13.2*
% contrib. election fund, year t   1 31.7 25.2* -21.0 21.7 28.3*
N 549 721 336 385
Dollar amounts are in real 1990 dollars. The * indicates dierence between preceding two columns is statistically
signicant at the 10% level or better. Column 3 is the estimated dierence in means between cheaters and honest
taxpayers, equal to (column 2 - column 1)/.31. Column 4 is hypothesized to have a substantially higher percentage
of honest taxpayers than column 5, so that the sign of the dierence is indicative of the dierence in means between
groups.
married ling jointly, and much more likely to le as head of household. Moreover, far more cheaters
experienced a change in their ling status in 1987. This is driven in large part by 1986 head of
household lers shifting to the less generous single ling status in 1987, though the dierence is
statistically imprecise. Head of household ling status is only available to unmarried individuals
with children. Cheaters were also much more likely to claim the Child Care Credit, which is a tax
credit for child care expenses incurred to enable parents or guardians to work. Taken together, the
evidence shows that cheaters gained not only from claiming an additional dependent exemption,
but also from moving to the head of household rate schedule and claiming (possibly fraudulent)
25credits for child care expenses.21 Cheaters were also less likely to contribute to an IRA and to
make a contribution to the presidential election campaign fund (which is plausibly correlated with
a sense of civic engagement). Other characteristics fail to show a statistically signicant dierence.
A second, related method of identifying dierences in characteristics of cheaters and honest
taxpayers comes from delineating two subgroups within the set of lers who lost a dependent in
1987. We hypothesize that having lost a dependent in years prior to the reform, when there was
no change in the enforcement technology for detecting misclaimed dependents, is an indication of
honesty. Thus, the group of individuals who lost dependents in 1987 and in earlier years likely
contains a high proportion of honest taxpayers. The group of individuals who lost dependents in
1987 but never before likely contains a higher proportion of cheaters. Table 4 shows the means
across these two subgroups, which are of roughly equal size, in columns 4 and 5. Asterisks in
column 5 indicate that there is a statistically signicant dierence at the 10% level using a simple
comparison of means across the two columns.
This alternative procedure shows the same qualitative results about ling status as the analysis
in columns 1-3. First-time dependent losers were less likely to be married ling jointly in 1986, and
more likely to be ling as a head of household. Many more rst-time losers experienced a change of
ling status in 1987. Similarly, signicantly more rst-time losers claimed the Child Care Credit in
1986. This alternative comparison also suggests that dierences in AGI, the fraction itemizing, the
fraction contributing to an IRA, and the fraction contributing to the election fund are statistically
dierent. With the exception of election fund contributions, the dierences go in the same direction
as in the previous comparison of cheaters and honest lers.
To address likely correlations across taxpayer characteristics, we next estimate a probit regres-
sion predicting dependent loss. We pool lers who are observed in two consecutive years up to and
including 1987, and restrict the sample to those claiming at least one dependent in the earlier year
of each pair. We control for a number of taxpayer characteristics, and interact each of these charac-
teristics with a dummy for 1987 observations. This allows us to test whether a given characteristic
aects the probability of dependent loss dierently in the year when many losses represent cheating.
21The IRS began requiring a Social Security Number or Taxpayer Identication Number for the care provider for
anyone claiming the Child Care Credit in 1989. As discussed in O'Neil and Lanese (1993) and cited by Slemrod
and Bakija (2008) (pp. 238-9), this reform was followed by a substantial increase in the number of claims of self-
employment income, a response similar in spirit to what we analyze here.
26Table 5: Probit Regression Predicting Dependent Loss
Coecient Coecient on 1987 Interaction
Married, year t   1 -0.026 0.006
(0.031) (0.068)
Head of Household, year t   1 0.070** 0.184**
(0.034) (0.081)
Change in Filing Status 1.049*** 0.234***
(0.025) (0.084)
Number of dependents, year t   1 0.185*** 0.111***
(0.006) (0.023)
Any Child Care Credit, year t   1 -0.543*** 0.059
(0.028) (0.075)
Any EITC, year t   1 -0.059*** 0.048
(0.022) (0.086)
Age 65 or older as of 1987 0.624*** 0.016
(0.036) (0.150)
Any IRA contribution, year t   1 0.183*** -0.103
(0.026) (0.075)
Real AGI, year t   1 (1000s) 0.0003** -0.0003
(0.0001) (0.0006)
N 55032
The sample includes lers at risk of losing a dependent between 1980 and 1987, those who claimed
at least one dependent in the previous tax year. The dependent variable is a dummy variable coded
as 1 if the ler lost a dependent between years t   1 and t. The *, ** and *** indicate statistical
signicance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels.
The results are shown in Table 5. In this specication, only measures of household composition
appear to be associated with cheating. While ling as head of household, relative to ling as a
single taxpayer, is always associated with a signicantly higher probability of dependent loss, this
eect is larger in 1987. The same is true for having experienced a change in ling status between
the two consecutive tax years. Other characteristics appear to aect dependent loss in the same
way in 1987 as in earlier years. Broadly, the results corroborate our conclusions above.
Third, we use a dierent decomposition to infer the dierence in characteristics across honest
taxpayers and cheaters. The prior two methodologies were premised on a comparison of taxpayers
who lost a dependent at dierent times, under dierent enforcement regimes. We can also compare
lers who lost a dependent to lers who gained a dependent.22 We start by noting that the mean
of some characteristic X, among those who gain a dependent (henceforth \a gainer") in a given
22We are especially grateful to Damon Jones for suggesting this approach.
27tax year t, can be written as the weighted sum of the mean of that characteristic for cheaters and














x;t is the average characteristic for gainers in year t (which is directly observable), 
g;c
x;t is
the average characteristic for gainers who are cheaters in year t, 
g;h
x;t is the average characteristic
for gainers who are honest in year t, and 
g
t is the probability that a gainer is a cheater in year t.









If we make assumptions about the stability of mean characteristics for cheaters and honest
taxpayers, then a comparison of the change in mean characteristics of gainers and losers spurred
by a change in enforcement (which is observable) can be used to infer the dierence in mean
characteristics of cheaters and honest types (which is not directly observable). Specically, we
assume that cheaters have the same characteristic mean, in both 1986 and 1987, regardless of









x. We make a parallel









x. Under these assumptions,
it is straightforward to show that the dierence in the mean characteristics between gainers and
















This same expression can be calculated for years before and after a reform that changes the proba-
bility that gainers and losers are cheaters in estimable ways. Writing out the dierence in dierence







tion 9 and rearranging yields an expression for the dierence in means across cheaters and honest



























28The left-hand side of equation 10 is exactly the same object as the one estimated by our rst
method and shown in column 3 of table 4. The numerator on the right-hand side is the dierence-
in-dierence across gainers and losers from 1986 to 1987. Each object in the numerator is directly
observable. The denominator is the dierence-in-dierence in the probability that gainers and losers
are cheaters between 1986 and 1987. Intuitively, this inference procedure examines the dierence-
in-dierence in a characteristic across gainers and losers { groups whose fraction of cheaters should
change sharply in 1987. The dierence-in-dierence inated by the change in fraction of cheaters
present in each pool yields an estimate of the dierence between cheaters and honest taxpayers.
The probabilities in the denominator are not observable directly, but they can be inferred
with relative precision under the assumption that the only reason that there were more losers and
fewer gainers in 1987 was the reaction of cheaters to the introduction of the SSN requirement for
dependents. Then, the change in the number of taxpayers gaining or losing a dependent provides
an estimate of the change in the probability that a gainer (loser) was a cheater.23 Proceeding
under that assumption, we can use equation 10 to calculate an estimate of the mean dierence in
characteristics across cheaters and honest taxpayers.
Table 6 shows the results of this exercise. Our previous estimates of c
x   h
x, from table 4,
are shown in column 1. Several characteristics from table 4 are omitted because they apply only
to dependent losers, and the second methodology requires means for gainers. The second column
shows estimates from the dierence-in-dierence decomposition for dependent gainers and losers.
Overall, the results are strikingly similar, given that they come from the comparison of dierent
subsamples and are motivated by dierent assumptions. The sign of the estimated dierence is
the same for all characteristics except our measure of geographic mobility (changing states), which
was not statistically dierent in our rst comparison. Moreover, the magnitude of the dierence is
qualitatively similar for most variables. This rearms our conclusion that cheaters were less likely
to be married, more likely to be heads of household and more likely to claim the Child Care Credit.
Our rst decomposition relied on the assumption that the mean characteristic for taxpayers who
lost a dependent in 1986 was an unbiased estimate of the mean characteristic of honest taxpayers
23An assumption about exactly how many cheaters were in each group in 1986 is still required because this inuences
the denominator in the probability calculations. We assume that no one losing a dependent in 1986 is a cheater, and
that no one gaining a dependent in 1987 is a cheater. Modifying these assumptions has a very modest impact on our
estimates.
29Table 6: Dierences Between Cheaters and Honest Taxpayers
Based on Timing Based on Comparison
of Dependent Loss of Gainers and Losers
(1) (2)
% Married, year t   1 -24.5 -29.8
% Head of Household, year t   1 25.2 34.6
% with Change in Filing Status 11.6 14.6
% with Change in State 1.9 -6.0
Mean dependents, year t   1 0.6 0.9
% with Child Care Credit, year t   1 16.1 7.4
% with EITC, year t   1 5.5 13.7
% age 65 or older as of 1987 -5.2 -8.3
% age 65 or older as of 1990 -6.5 -9.8
Mean AGI ($), year t   1 -468 -4,723
% itemizing, year t   1 -14.8 -27.1
% contributing to IRA, year t   1 -16.8 -26.2
% contributing to election fund, year t   1 -21.0 -25.0
Column 1 repeats the estimate of the dierence in the mean of the characteristic for cheaters and honest types
from table 4. The second column is an estimate of the same parameter (the dierence in the mean of the
characteristic for cheaters and honest types) based on the dierence-in-dierence statistic from equation 10.
who lost a dependent in 1987. In the second decomposition, we instead make the assumption that
honest taxpayers have the same mean characteristic in 1986 and 1987, regardless of whether they are
gainers or losers. Similarly, we assume that cheating taxpayers who gain a dependent in 1986 have
the same mean characteristics as cheating taxpayers who lose a dependent in 1987. (As a reminder,
we are measuring characteristics in year t   1, so the mean characteristics are not inuenced by
the changes in the tax code included in TRA86 in either method.) Neither assumption is free of
potential criticism, but having two distinct sets of assumptions allows us to check for the robustness
of our conclusions from the rst methodology.24
24We have calculated parallel comparisons that compare 1987 to pooled means across 1980-1986, which has the
advantage of increasing the sample size. Most of our ndings are robust to this change in comparison group, but the
dierences between the two methodologies is inated for several characteristics, including claiming of the Child Care
Credit, itemizing, and IRA contributions. This may not be surprising, however, because there are other changes in
the tax code in that time period which make assumptions about stability of means across dierent time periods much
stronger than in the two-year comparison.
306.2 Cheaters do not have particularly large tax benets from dependents
What explains the fact that some people cheat on their taxes by claiming inappropriate dependent
exemptions and others do not? Is the dierence driven mostly by variation in the willingness to
pay to be honest, or mostly by variation in the tax savings associated with claiming an additional
dependent? One possibility is that there is a limited amount of variation in the willingness to pay
to be honest. In the extreme, suppose that all people have the same willingness to pay to be honest.
Then, the only determinant of whether or not a person cheats is his tax gain from doing so. This
implies that cheaters will have noticeably higher tax savings from the marginal dependent than will
honest payers.
A second possibility is that there is considerable variation in the willingness to pay to be honest.
In this scenario, the link between the monetary gain from cheating and the probability of cheating
might be weak, depending on the correlation between tax savings (largely a function of income) and
honesty. Assuming that tax savings and honesty are not too tightly correlated, as the variation in
the willingness to pay to be honest rises, the relationship between cheating and tax savings from an
additional dependent will dissipate. Thus, qualitatively, if there is a weak relationship between tax
savings and cheating, we will conclude that heterogeneity in honesty is the primary determinant of
cheating behavior, but we will conclude the opposite if the link is strong.25
To test whether or not tax savings are closely correlated with cheating, we rst refer back to table
2, which shows the tax savings from changing the number of dependents for dierent subsamples.
We focus on comparing the average tax savings of lers who lost a dependent in 1987, about one-
third of whom are cheaters, to other groups of lers who contain few or no cheaters. Table 2 shows
that those losing a dependent in 1987 had a mean tax savings for their last dependent claimed in
1986 of $253 (the benet from cheating for an observed cheater is the tax change associated with
losing the marginal dependent claimed).
Groups devoid of cheaters had similar, or even slightly larger, tax savings from cheating. Those
who claimed no dependents in 1986 clearly were not cheating. The benet from cheating for that
group is equal to the value of gaining a rst dependent, which is on average $291 in 1986. Similarly,
25Note that this setup assumes relatively little variation in risk preferences and the probability of audit. Because
risk has little impact on the valuation of evasion, this portion of the assumption is innocuous, but if there is substantial
heterogeneity in the subjective probability assigned to being audited, then this could also play a signicant role in
explaining the decision to evade.
31Table 7: Tax Savings From Claiming A Dependent, All Years
Gain from One Loss from One
More Dependent Fewer Dependent
Year t   1 No Loss Lost Dep No Loss Lost Dep
in t in t in t in t
(1) (2) (3) (4)
1979 234 226 -274 -266
1980 243 240 -282 -275
1981 254 237 -289 -279
1982 240 229 -270 -253
1983 228 221 -259 -249
1984 223 219 -252 -243
1985 232 218 -266 -254
1986 243 224 -276 -254
1987 349 346 -428 -415
1988 340 313 -436 -390
1989 348 330 -457 -406
Estimates are author's calculations using TAXSIM.
those who had a dependent in 1986 but did not lose a dependent in 1987 are unlikely to be cheaters.
This group had a mean tax value of $243. The last row in table 2 shows these two groups combined.
Together, they could have gained $275 on average from claiming a false dependent. This indicates
that cheaters and honest lers faced similar incentives.
An alternative way to infer the tax savings enjoyed by cheaters involves a comparison across
dierent years. Table 7 presents the average tax savings associated with claiming a dependent in
each year of our panel. We believe that the values in the t   1 = 1986 row of columns 2 and 4
contain a large number of cheaters. If cheaters have systematically higher tax savings from claiming
a dependent, and if those who lost a dependent for legitimate reasons in 1987 had tax savings similar
to those who lost a dependent in prior years, then we would expect particularly high tax savings
in the t 1 = 1986 sample. Such a pattern is not evident. This sample had an average tax value of
$254 from losing their last dependent. This is exactly the same as the average value in the previous
year, and quite similar to all of the values stretching back to the beginning of our sample in 1979.
This is further evidence that cheaters and honest taxpayers had similarly-sized tax benets from
claiming a dependent.
Figure 6 goes beyond comparisons of means by plotting the empirical cumulative distribution of
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Figure shows empirical distributions of the tax savings associated with a marginal dependent for those losing a
dependent and those not losing a dependent in the policy change year (a) and earlier years (b). Panels (c) and (d)
show the same statistics for the subset of lers that have a non-zero tax value. All calculations are for tax values in
year t   1, where t is the year when the dependent was lost.
tax values for relevant subsamples. Figure 6a shows the distribution for those who lost a dependent
in 1987 and those who did not lose a dependent in 1987. If the driving force behind cheating is tax
savings, we would expect that those who lost a dependent in 1987 { many of whom were cheaters {
would have higher tax values than those who did not cheat. This is not the case. The distribution
for those losing a dependent lies above the distribution for those who did not lose a dependent,
which implies that they had lower gains from claiming an additional dependent.
Figure 6b shows the same comparison for years before the policy reform. This shows that
33the distributions are fairly similar, though there is a dierence in the number with a zero tax
value { more of those who lost a dependent in pre-1987 years had a zero value from an additional
dependent. To eliminate any dierences in the distribution due strictly to the zero values, gures 6c
and 6d show the same distributions, limited to those with positive estimated tax values. Now, the
pre-reform years look very similar, which suggests that, when there is no change in the incentive to
cheat, the tax value distributions of those losing a dependent and those not losing are quite similar.
Nevertheless, the policy reform year still shows a dierence { those who lost a dependent had lower
tax values.
Overall, this evidence suggests that cheaters did not have especially large gains from claiming
additional children. This implies that the main driver of the decision to cheat was not the amount
of money at stake, but rather variation in the taste for honesty.
7 Conclusion
The case of the missing children provides a unique opportunity for examining taxpayers' evasion
behavior. Two main lessons emerge from our analysis. First, this episode demonstrates that while
a substantial number of taxpayers lied to the IRS in order to save on their taxes, a much larger
fraction of taxpayers passed up an easily accomplished evasion opportunity. These honest taxpayers
gave up hundreds of dollars of tax savings, which amounted to an average of 7% of their tax bill.
This choice reveals a substantial and widespread willingness to pay to be honest. We think this
is an important addendum to recent research that concludes that evasion is driven primarily by
access to evasion opportunities and monitoring ecacy, as in Kleven et al. (2010). The evidence
here suggests a greater role for a preference for honesty.
Second, the available evidence indicates that heterogeneity in willingness to cheat outweighed
heterogeneity in the tax savings associated with children in determining who cheated and who
did not. Cheaters do appear to be dierent from honest taxpayers, on average, in some key
characteristics, like ling status, but these dierences do not translate to substantial dierences in
the average tax savings from claiming children. This suggests that something other than variation
in the tax benet of a child plays an important role in determining who cheated and who did
not. We interpret this as evidence that there is important variation in the willingness to pay to be
34honest.
Finally, we believe that our methodology for inferring the characteristics of cheaters, our use
of a natural experiment, and our analysis of an evasion opportunity available to virtually all tax-
payers constitute contributions to the larger literature on the economics of income tax evasion. In
particular, our work contributes to the emerging research stream of research that studies \traces
of evasion" (Slemrod and Weber Forthcoming) by showing an additional way of learning about
evasion in the absence of audit data.
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